Dynamic Efficiency Estimation: An Application to US Electric Utilities by Rungsuriyawiboon, Supawat & Stefano, Spiro E.
 
 
 
 
 
Centre for Efficiency and Productivity Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper Series 
No. 05/2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date: July 2003 
 
 
 
School of Economics 
University of Queensland 
St. Lucia, Qld. 4072 
Australia 
 
 
Title 
Dynamic Efficiency Estimation: An Application to 
US Electric Utilities  
 
Authors 
Supawat Rungsuriyawiboon 
and Spiro E. Stefanou 
 
Dynamic Efficiency Estimation: An Application to US Electric Utilities1    
 
 
Supawat Rungsuriyawiboon and Spiro E. Stefanou2 
 
July 2003 
 
Abstract 
 
The static production efficiency model and the dynamic duality model of intertemporal 
decision making using a parametric approach have been continuously developed but in separate 
direction. In this study the static shadow cost approach and the dynamic duality model of 
intertemporal decision making are integrated to formulate theoretical and econometric models of 
dynamic efficiency with intertemporal cost minimizing firm behavior. The dynamic efficiency 
model is empirically implemented using a panel data set of 72 U.S. major investor-owned 
electric utilities using fossil-fuel fired steam electric power generation during the time period of 
1986 to 1999. The major results of this study are that most electric utilities in this study 
underutilized fuel relative to the aggregated labor and maintenance input and they overutilized 
capital in production. Electric utilities with relatively high technical inefficiency of variable 
inputs demand in production in states adopting a deregulation plan improve the performance of 
the utilities. The estimates of the input price elasticities present the substitution possibilities 
among the inputs. Finally, the results suggest evidence of increasing returns to scale in the 
production of the electricity industry. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Electricity deregulation and restructuring are now on the policy agenda in many states. 
The basis for historical regulation of the electricity industries has been to deal with natural 
monopoly issues in the production of electricity. The first main step toward deregulation was the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) passed by the Congress which allowed 
                                                 
1  The paper is under review of Journal of Econometrics; 
2   The authors are, respectively, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Centre of Efficiency and Productivity 
Analysis, University of Queensland and Professor of Agricultural Economics, Pennsylvania State University.  The 
authors appreciate the comments of Tim Considine, Ted Jaenicke, Prasada Rao, Tim Coelli, and Chris O’Donnell.   
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independent generators to sell their electricity to utilities at regulated rates3. Under regulation, 
electric utilities had a guaranteed profit for the generation of electricity. This led to strong 
incentives to overinvest in capital as well as operating at an inefficient level of production which 
is of broad interest for researchers and policymakers [e.g., Averch and Johnson (1962), Atkinson 
and Halvorson (1980), Crew and Kleindorfer (2002), Granderson and Linvill (2002)]. The level 
of inefficiency of electric utilities and the forces driving inefficient levels of production 
electricity are critical concerns. The 1992 Energy Policy Act, followed by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s (FERC’s) Orders 888 and 889 in April of 1996, expanded PURPA’s 
initiative by forcing utilities with transmission networks to deliver power to third parties at 
nondiscriminatory cost-based rates. These policy initiatives recognize that while electrical 
transmission and distribution remain natural monopolies, competition in generation is possible 
with new technology (e.g., gas turbines) that can achieve optimal size at modest scale and with 
open access to transportation networks. Policies to open markets led to new competitors in 
generation and marketing, with a restructuring of the industry away from the regulated, 
single-provider model. Deregulation in the electricity markets has been incomplete to date with 
continued regulation in some segments. Under partial regulation, electricity markets are not 
really deregulated but restructured. Vertical integration has diminished and some stages of 
electricity provision must compete in the market place. Deregulation of energy generation will 
provide important incentives for the efficient operation of electrical generators and it should 
provide firms the incentives to lower costs by improving technical and input allocative efficiency 
to maximize their profits. Understanding the cost structure of electric utilities in addition to other 
                                                 
3  Smith (1996) presents an interpretive overview of the history and patterns of regulation in the electric 
industry and notes that regulations in early 1900s were not motivated by a consumerist response to monopoly 
pricing but rather served to protect the industry from the competitive pricing which dominated at that time.   
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economically meaningful measurements such as technical and allocative efficiencies, economies 
of scale, and technology in the electricity industry, provides insightful information for policy 
makers in dealing with the issues related to restructuring the electricity industry. 
 
2. Background 
The estimation of the cost structure and scale economies of electric power generation in 
the U.S. has been extensively studied since the 1960s. The earlier studies defined various 
functional forms of cost functions and applied the estimation approach of the cost structure 
maintaining that all producers operate efficiently [Nerlove (1963), Christensen and Greene 
(1976), Considine (2000)]. The recent empirical applications of electric power generation relax 
this assumption to measure the inefficiency occurring in the production cost [Schmidt and Lovell 
(1979), Hiebert (2002)].  The stochastic cost frontier is applied to estimate the inefficiency level 
of each producer and assumes that an efficiently operating producer is represented by the 
estimated cost frontier. If a producer’s observed costs are higher than the frontier, that deviation 
is attributed, in part, to inefficiency. A shortcoming of the stochastic frontier approach is the 
computational difficulties for decompositions of economic efficiency in the estimation. This 
shortcoming can be remedied by using stochastic estimation of the shadow cost approach. A 
shadow cost function is expressed in terms of shadow input prices and outputs, where shadow 
prices (internal to the firm) are defined as input prices forcing the technically efficient input 
vector to be the cost minimizing solution for producing a given output. Shadow prices will differ 
from market (actual) prices in the presence of inefficiency. However, these two approaches  
measuring inefficiency arising from production cost are developed under the static context are 
conditioned on some inputs, referred to as quasi-fixed inputs. The shortcomings of the static 
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approaches include ignoring the explicit the role of time and how the adjustment of quasi-fixed 
inputs to the observed long-run level takes place. The analysis of the transition path of quasi-
fixed factors toward their desired long-run levels can be remedied by explicitly incorporating 
costs of adjustment for the quasi-fixed factors. The underlying idea is that the adjustment process 
of quasi-fixed factors generates additional transition costs and the optimal intertemporal behavior 
of the firm can be solved by appealing to the notion of adjustment costs in solving the firm’s 
optimization problem. 
This study incorporates adjustment costs for the quasi-fixed factors into a model of firm 
behavior leading the firm’s dynamic production decision problem. The static shadow cost 
approach is generalized using the dynamic duality model of intertemporal decision making to 
establish a dynamic efficiency model of the cost minimizing firm. The specific objectives of this 
study are to estimate and decompose cost inefficiency of the U.S. electric power generation, 
characterize the cost structure under dynamic adjustment and evaluate how different electric 
utilities will perform that are located within or outside of states with  a restructuring plan.   
The next section presents the theoretical background on the economics of efficiency and 
dynamic factor demands, followed by the development of the integrated theoretical and 
econometric models of a dynamic efficiency model.  This is followed by a discussion of the 
primary sources of data used to construct the data set and key assumptions underlying the 
construction. The next section presents the estimation results of the dynamic efficiency model 
and then conclusions follow. 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1. Decomposition of Economic Efficiency and Shadow Cost Approach 
 Consider producers facing a strictly non-negative vector of input prices NRw ++∈  seeking 
to minimize the cost xw′ , given a non-negative vector of input quantities denoted NRx +∈ , which 
they incur in producing a non-negative vector of outputs MRy +∈ . The input-oriented 
measurement and decomposition of cost efficiency are illustrated in Figure 1. A producer uses 
input xA, available at price wA, to produce output yA which is measured using Isoq )( AyL . The 
measure of cost efficiency is given by the ratio of minimum cost EAAA xwwyC ′=),(  to actual cost 
AAxw′ . The input-oriented technical efficiency of the producer can be defined as the ratio of 
expenditure at AAA xw φ′  to expenditure at AAxw′ . A measure of input allocative efficiency is 
defined as the ratio of cost efficiency to input-oriented technical efficiency, ( ) ( )AAAEA xwxw φ′′ . 
Figure 1 also illustrates how shadow prices, *w , are input prices that make the technically 
efficient input vector AAxφ  the minimum cost solution for producing a given output yA. An input-
oriented measure of the technical efficiency of the producer is provided by 1<Aφ  since 
( )AAxfy φ= . The producer is also allocatively inefficient since the marginal rate of substitution at 
( )AAA yLx ∈φ  diverges from the actual input price Aw . However the producer is allocatively 
efficient relative to the shadow input price An ww 1* θ=  where  1nθ  represents the values of 
allocative inefficiency of variable input demands. An estimate of allocative inefficiency of 
variable input demands greater (less) than one means that the ratio of the shadow price of the nth 
variable input relative to the first variable input is considerably greater (less) than the 
corresponding ratio of actual prices. This implies that the firms are under- (over-) utilizing the nth 
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variable input relative to the first variable input. Following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) who 
generalize the early formulations of modeling inefficiency in dual function found in Toda (1976) 
and Atkinson and Halvorson (1980), a shadow cost function is expressed in terms of shadow 
input prices and outputs. Given a flexible functional form to specify the shadow cost function, 
the stochastic shadow cost system consisting of the producer’s observed costs and observed input 
demand in terms of shadow input prices and outputs can be estimated after appending a linear 
disturbance into each equation. 
 
 3.2. Dynamic Duality Theory of Intertemporal Decision Making 
Consider the intertemporal model where the firm seeks to minimize the discounted sum 
of future production costs over an infinite horizon and the firm holds static expectations on the 
set of prices and the sequence of production targets4 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]dsscKsxwetytKcwJ
t
rs
I ∫
∞ −
> +′= 0min,,,   (1) 
subject to   ( ) ( ) ( )sKsIsK δ−=& ,    ( ) ( ) 0,00 0 >>= sKKK , and    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]sKsKsxFsy &,,= , for all [ )∞∈ ,ts , 
where w is vector of variable input prices; x and K are vectors of variable inputs and quasi-fixed 
inputs, respectively; c is the vector of rental prices of quasi-fixed inputs; I and K& are gross and 
net rates of investment, respectively; r is the constant discount rate ;δ  is a constant depreciation 
rate; ( )sy  is a sequence of production targets over the planning horizon starting at time t and 
( ) ( ) ( )( )sKsKsxF &,,  is the single output production function. The inclusion of net investment K&  in 
                                                 
4  Price expectations are static in the sense that the decision maker expects the current real prices and 
technology to persist indefinitely in each base period (Epstein and Denny, 1983). 
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the production function reflects the internal cost associated with adjusting quasi-fixed factors in 
terms of foregone output.  
 The dynamic programming equation for the problem (1) can be expressed as    
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }KKxFyJKIcKxwyKcwrJ kIx &,,min,,, 0, −+−++′= > γδ , (2) 
where 0≥γ  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the production target and is defined as 
the short-run, instantaneous marginal cost (Stefanou, 1989). 
Epstein (1981) demonstrates that a full dynamic duality can be solved by the appropriate 
static optimization problem as expressed in the dynamic programming equation. The result of 
intertemporal duality theory is that it provides readily implemental systems of dynamic factor 
demands. Differentiating the optimized version of the dynamic programming equation with 
respect to c and w yields optimal net investment demand and optimal variable input demand, 
respectively,  
( )KrJJK ckc −= −1*& , and, ( )( )KrJJJrJKJrJx ckckwwkww −−=−= −1** & . (3) 
Empirical application of these dynamic factor demand specifications include Epstein and Denny 
(1983), Vasavada and Chambers (1986), Bernstein and Nadiri (1988), Fernandez-Cornejo et al 
(1992), and Luh and Stefanou (1991, 1996). 
 
4. Specification of Dynamic Efficiency Model 
 
4.1. Dynamic Efficiency Model Derivation 
 The static shadow cost model presented in Section 3.1 is generalized using the dynamic 
duality model of intertemporal decision making presented in Section 3.2. In the presence of 
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allocative and technical inefficiencies in the production function, the behavioral value function 
of the dynamic programming equation for the firms’ intertemporal cost minimization behavior in 
the presence of technical change that corresponds to the shadow prices and quantities can be 
expressed in the form of a behavioral Hamiton-Jacobi equation,   
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ,,,,,,,, ,, bittitbititbnititbnb itkbitititbnitbnitititititbnitb JtKKxFyJKKcxwtyKcwrJ +−++′+′= ′ && γ  (4)  
where KJJ bitb itk ∂∂=,  and tJJ bitbitt ∂∂=, ; Nn ,...,1=  index of variable inputs; Ii ,...,1=  index of firms; 
Tt ,...,1=  index of time periods; c is the user cost of capital; K is a quasi-fixed input of capital 
stock; y is the output; t is time trend; ( )NNb www λλ ,...,11=  with 0>nλ  representing the behavioral 
prices of variable inputs; nλ is the allocative inefficiency parameters for nth variable input; nw  is 
the observed nth variable input price; akbk JJ µ=  represents the marginal behavioral value of capital 
where akJ  represents the observed marginal value of capital and µ  is the allocative inefficiency 
parameter of net investment; ( )xx xb τ1=  represents the behavioral variable inputs where 1≥xτ  is 
the inverse of producer-specific scalars providing input-oriented measures of the technical 
efficiency in variable input use and  x is the observed variable input use; ( )KK kb && τ1=  represents 
the behavioral net investment level where 1≥kτ  is the inverse of producer-specific scalars 
providing input-oriented measures of the technical efficiency in net investment and dtdKK =&  is 
the level of net investment; 0≥bγ  is the behavioral Lagrangian multiplier defined as the 
short-run, instantaneous marginal cost. 
 If the nth variable input is allocatively efficient, nλ  = 1. The values of nλ >1 (or <1) imply 
that the decision maker, ceteris paribus, allocates less (or more) of input nth compared to the cost 
minimizing allocation. By specifying the first variable input price as the numeraire, the prices of 
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variable inputs demands are redefined as ( ) nitnbnit ww 1λλ= = nitin w1θ , where Nn ,..,1=  and 111 =iθ . 
The values of allocative efficiency of variable inputs demands, in1θ , represent price distortions of 
the nth variable input relative to the first variable input. An estimate of allocative efficiency of 
variable inputs demands greater (less) than one means that the ratio of the shadow price of the nth 
variable input relative to the first variable input is considerably greater (less) than the 
corresponding ratio of actual prices. This implies that the firms are under- (over-) utilizing the nth 
variable input relative to the first variable input. 
 Without the notation of the indices of variable inputs, firms and time periods, the 
behavioral value function of the dynamic programming equation in (4) by using the basic idea 
underlying the input-oriented efficiency measurement approach can be rewritten in terms of 
( )tyKcwJ b ,,,,λ  as   
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ).,,,,,,, ⋅+−+⋅+′+′= ′ btbbbbkbbb JtKKxFyJKKcxwtyKcwrJ && γλλ  (5) 
Differentiating (5) with respect to c and ( )wλ , respectively, yields optimal investment demand  
 ( ) ( ) ( )⋅+⋅+=⋅ ′ btcbkcbbc JJKKrJ & , or, 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )⋅−−⋅⋅=⋅ − btcbcbkcb JKrJJK 1& , (6) 
and optimal variable input demand  
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )⋅+⋅+=⋅ ′ b wtb wkbbb w JJKxrJ λλλ & , or,   
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )⋅−⋅⋅−⋅=⋅ ′− btwbkwbbwb JJKrJx &1λ . (7) 
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In the presence of technical inefficiency of net investment and variable inputs, the corresponding 
observed investment and variable input demands using the input-oriented approach can be 
written in terms of the optimal investment and variable input demands as  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )⋅−−⋅⋅=⋅= − btcbcbkckbko JKrJJKK 1ττ && , (8) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )⋅−⋅−⋅=⋅= ′− btwbkwkobwxbxo JJKrJxx τλττ &1 . (9) 
 
The dynamic programming equation for the firms’ intertemporal cost minimization behavior 
corresponding to the actual prices and quantities can be expressed as  
 ( )( ) atbbaaka JtKKxFyJKKcxwrJ +−+′+′+′= ,,, && γ , (10) 
where input-oriented efficiency measurement is maintained. Considering the actual quantities as 
the optimal levels, optimized actual quantities are ( )⋅= bko KK && τ  and ( )⋅= bxo xx τ . The optimized 
actual dynamic programming equation can be expressed as  
 atakooa JJKKcxwrJ ++′+′= ′& , (11) 
where ( )⋅= bkak JJ )1( µ  implying the marginal behavioral value of capital diverges from the 
marginal actual value of capital by µ , and assuming a shift in the behavioral value function is 
the same proportion as the actual value function so that ( )⋅= btat JJ . The optimized actual value 
function can be rewritten in the terms of the behavioral value function as follows  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )⋅+⋅⋅+′+⋅−⋅⋅−⋅′= ′ btbkbkbtwbkwbbwxa JJKKcJJKrJwrJ µτλτ && . (12) 
Differentiating (11) with respect to c and w, respectively, optimized actual investment demand 
yields  
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 atcakcoac JJKKrJ ++= ′& , or ,  ( ) ( )atcacakco JKrJJK −−= −1& , (13) 
and optimized actual variable input demand yields  
 atwakwooaw JJKxrJ ++= ′& , or ,  atwakwoawo JJKrJx −−= ′& . (14) 
Differentiating (12) with respect to c and substituting into (13), the optimized actual investment 
demand in terms of the behavioral value function yields (up to second order terms)5  
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Differentiating (12) with respect to w and substituting into (14), the optimized actual variable 
input demand in terms of the behavioral value function yields (up to second order terms)  
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The behavioral conditional demand for the numeraire variable input is derived by rearranging the 
behavioral optimized value function of the dynamic programming equation in equation (5) as   
 ( ) ( ) ,btbkbbbbnb JJKcKxwxrJ +⋅++⋅+= &  (17) 
                                                 
5  Third order terms involving the derivative of ( )bJ  with respect to ( )kcw ,,  and ( )tcw ,,  are ignored. The 
econometric specification that follows is flexible up to second order terms. 
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where bnx  is the behavioral demand for the numeraire variable input, and 
bx  is the behavioral 
demand for the other variable inputs, leading to the behavioral conditional demand for the 
numeraire variable input defined as   
 ( ) ( ) ( ) .btbkbbbbbn JJKcKxwrJx −⋅−−⋅−=⋅ &  (18) 
The optimized actual demand for the numeraire variable input is  
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }btbkbbbbxbnxon JJKcKxwrJxx −⋅−−⋅−=⋅= &ττ . (19) 
 
The optimal investment demand function for the single quasi-fixed factor case in (6) [Treadway 
(1971, 1974)] can be expressed as a univariate linear accelerator  
( ) ( ) ( )( )tycwKKMKtyKcwK bititbitbit ,,,,,,, ** −=⋅= && , (20) 
where M  is the partial adjustment coefficient which indicates how quickly the current level of 
capital stock, itK , will adjust to the optimal capital stock levels, *itK .  
 With two variable inputs and single quasi-fixed input of capital stock, the behavioral 
value function taking the quadratic functional form and assuming symmetry of the parameters 
where jiij AA = can be specified as  
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where ( )tyKcwwP bb ′′′′=′ ′′ 21 . 
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4.2. Estimation Approach 
 The producer and input specific estimates of technical and allocative efficiencies must be 
specified to implement the dynamic efficiency model in the panel data context. Following 
Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990), the allocative and technical efficiencies of net 
investment and of variable inputs6 are specified as producer specific and time-varying specific 
parameters. All coefficient parameters of the system of equations in (15) and (16) can be 
estimated after appending a linear disturbance vector with mean vector zero and 
variance-covariance matrix Σ into the system equation. Joint estimation of the system equation 
provides parameter estimates of the behavioral value function represented by equation (21).  
Appendix A presents the specification of (15) and (16) for the functional form in (21).  Further, 
the net investment equation does conform to the linear accelerator in (20) where ( )[ ]1−− ckAr  is 
the adjustment rate per annum. 
 The maintained model is recursive in the endogenous variable of net investment demand, 
serving as an explanatory variable in the variable input demand equations. The estimation can be 
accomplished in two stages. In the first stage, the net investment demand is estimated by using 
the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). In the second stage, since the variable input demand 
equations are over-identified, the system of variable input demand equations is estimated by 
using the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimation given all parameter values that 
were obtained in the first stage. All predetermined variables, which include exogenous and 
dummy variables of each equation in the variable input demand equations, are defined as the 
instrumental variables of the system equation in the second stage. One proposal of the GMM 
                                                 
6  The allocative and technical efficiencies of net investment and of variable inputs are guaranteed to be 
non-negative by using the exponential transformation. 
 14
estimation is to find instrumental variables, z , that are correlated with exogenous variables in the 
model but uncorrelated with the residual, ε , implying the orthogonality conditions, 0)'( =εzE . If 
the disturbances are heteroscedastic and serially correlated, the estimation in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation can be corrected by applying a flexible approach 
developed by Newey and West (1987). The number of autocorrelation terms used in computing 
the covariance matrix of the orthogonality conditions can be determined by the procedure of 
Newey and West (1994). However, estimating all parameters from the system of equations in 
(15) and (16) leads to the singularity in estimation due to a high nonlinearity of both the net 
investment demand and the variable input demand equations and the inclusion of many dummy 
variables. An alternative estimation approach can be accomplished by estimating the system of 
equations in (8), (9) and (19) and then estimating the remaining parameters of the system of 
equations in (15) and (16). 
 
5. Discussion of Data 
 Data on fossil-fuel fired steam electric power generation for major investor-owned 
utilities in the United States are used to construct a data set in this study because these are the 
dominant sectors of the U.S. electricity industry7. The primary sources of data are obtained from 
the Energy Information Administration (EIA Form 1, Form 423, Form 759, Form 860a), the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC Form 1) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS).  Output variable is represented by net steam electric power generation in megawatt-hour 
which is defined as the amount of power produced using fossil-fuel fired boilers to produce 
                                                 
7  Approximately 61 percent of all the electricity in 1999 supplied by the U.S. electric power industry comes 
from fossil fuel-fired steam turbines. Investor-Owned Utilities own 71 percent of the U.S. generating capacity 
owned by both utilities and nonutility generators and are responsible for 74 percent of all retail sales of electricity 
(EIA 2000). 
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steam for turbine generators during a given period of time. The price of fuel aggregate is an 
average price of fuels (i.e. coal, oil, gas) in dollars per British Thermal Units (BTU). The fuel 
quantities can be calculated by dividing the fuel expenses by the average price of fuels in dollars 
per BTU. The aggregate price of labor and maintenance is a cost-share weighted price for labor 
and maintenance. The price of labor is a company-wide average wage rate. The price of 
maintenance and other supplies is a price index of electrical supplies from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The weight is calculated from the labor cost share of nonfuel variable costs for those 
utilities with entirely steam power production. Quantities of labor and maintenance equal the 
aggregate costs of labor and maintenance divided by a cost-share weighted price for labor and 
maintenance. The capital stock is measured by using estimates of capital costs as discussed in 
Considine (2000). The values of capital stocks are calculated by the valuation of base and peak 
load capacity at replacement cost to estimate capital stocks in a base year and then updating it in 
the subsequent years based upon the value of additions and retirements to steam power plant. 
The price of capital is the yield of the firm’s latest issue of long term debt adjusted for 
appreciation and depreciation of the capital good using the Christensen and Jorgenson (1970) 
cost of capital formula. 
 Initially all these data sources were combined to construct a data set from the variables 
for 110 electric utilities with all variables defined for the time periods 1986-1999. Electric 
utilities which are subsidiaries of holding companies8 are aggregated into one entity. Once the 
holding companies which have generating plants located in both states with and without the 
deregulation plan were excluded, the remaining 72 electric utilities comprised the panel used in 
this study. They are divided into two groups according to the status of state electric industry 
                                                 
8  Christensen and Greene (1976) showed that failure to recognize holding companies results in 
underestimating scale economies. 
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restructuring activity. Electric utilities within “Group A” have all plants located in states which 
enacted enabling legislation or issued a regulatory order to implement retail access while utilities 
within “Group B” have all plants located in states without the deregulation plan. The final set of 
the panel data on 72 electric utilities over the time period of 1986 to 1999 is used in this study. 
Lists of the electric utilities are presented in Appendix B. 
 
6. Empirical Results  
The dynamic efficiency model accounts for four inefficiency parameters: technical and 
allocative inefficiencies in net investment and variable input demands. Estimation of the system 
equation is complicated the highly nonlinear net investment demand equation leading to the 
singularity of estimating the net investment demand in the first stage of the estimation. An 
additional assumption that firms are perfectly technical efficient in net investment demand is 
assumed to implement the estimation.  While this assumption permits estimation of the system, it 
is also not as restrictive in this context as may first appear.  Technical inefficiency of net 
investment, τk, is represented by the physical operation of generating plants. Thermal conversion 
efficiency is used to measure the performance of generating plants. The report of EIA showed 
that the standard deviation of an average plant efficiency of steam electric power generating 
plants measured by thermal conversion efficiency is very low for each plant.9   
                                                 
9  Further, a sensitivity analysis on the technical efficiency parameter of net investment was performed by 
varying the technical efficiency parameter of net investment between 0.60 and 1.00.  The likelihood and R2 for each 
estimated equation are quite stable within this range and suggest no statistically significant change between the 
model with  τk  = 1 and τk equal to any other value less than unity. While τk  is firm and time-invariant, it’s value on 
average should signal an alert concerning the potential misspecification of perfect technical efficiency in net 
investment.  This statistical result along with the report of EIA showing that the low standard deviation of an 
average plant efficiency of steam electric power generating plants measured by thermal conversion efficiency 
suggests the assumption that τk  = 1 is a tolerable one. 
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 Assuming a constant real interest rate of 5 percent, the estimated coefficients, standard 
errors, and p-values for the structural parameters of the full model using GMM estimation are 
presented in Table 110. A lag of two periods of autocorrelation terms is used to compute the 
covariance matrix of the orthogonality conditions for the GMM estimation. R2 values of net 
investment demand, of fuel and the labor and maintenance aggregate are 0.025, 0.976, and 0.951, 
respectively. The test of overidentifying restrictions from GMM estimation using the Hansen 
(1982) J  test is significant. The null hypothesis fails to reject implying that the additional 
instrumental variables are valid, given a subset of the instrument variables is valid and exactly 
identifies the coefficient. 
Table 2 presents average firm allocative and technical efficiencies of net investment and 
of variable input demands by all electric utilities and the group of electric utilities affected by the 
deregulation plan. The technical efficiency parameter of net investment is assumed to be unity. 
The allocative efficiencies of net investment range from 0.200 by Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 
(CA) to 1.218 by Montana Power Co. (MT) with an average of 0.594. The estimated value of the 
allocative efficiency of net investment is less than one implying that firms are over-utilizing the 
net investment. The estimated technical efficiencies of variable inputs range from 0.241 by 
Texas Utility Electric Co. (TX) to 0.991 by Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. (NY) with an 
average of 0.767. By specifying the aggregate prices of labor and maintenance as the 
numeraire11, the estimated allocative efficiencies of variable inputs range from 0.084 by Montana 
Power Co. (MT) to 6.464 by Gulf State Utilities Co. (TX) with an average of 3.105. The values 
                                                 
10  The full set of estimated coefficients including the dummy variables used to calculate the allocative 
inefficiency parameters of variable inputs and net investment demands and the technical inefficiency parameter of 
variable input demand are available upon request from the author. 
11      Choice of numeraire is arbitrarily selected in the empirical application. Factors used to decide the choice 
of numeraire are adjustment rate, the quality of estimation, convergence, and signs confirmation. 
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of allocative efficiency of variable input demands represent price distortions of fuel relative to 
the aggregate of labor and maintenance. An estimate of allocative efficiency of variable input 
demands greater than one means that the ratio of the shadow price of fuel relative to that of the 
labor and maintenance aggregate is considerably greater than the corresponding ratio of actual 
prices implying that the firms are under-utilizing fuel relative to the aggregate of labor and 
maintenance. The estimated results indicate that all electric utilities in this study except by two 
firms, Montana Power Co. (MT) and Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. (IN) under-utilized 
fuel relative to the aggregate of labor and maintenance. Moreover, all electric utilities in this 
study indicate over-utilization of net investment except by one firm, Montana Power Co. (MT). 
The results indicate that electric utilities located within states with the deregulation plan have 
average firm technical efficiency of variable inputs lower than electric utilities located outside of 
states with the deregulation plan. This result suggests that electric utilities with relatively high 
technical inefficiency in states adopting a deregulation plan improve the performance of their 
electric utilities. Furthermore, electric utilities located within states with a deregulation plan 
present average firm allocative efficiencies of variable inputs and of net investment lower than 
electric utilities located outside of states with the deregulation plan. These results imply that 
electric utilities located within states with the deregulation plan are under-utilizing fuel relative 
to the aggregate of labor and maintenance less than those located outside of states with a 
deregulation plan and over-utilizing net investment compared to those located outside of states 
with a deregulation plan. However, the magnitudes of the difference of allocative efficiencies of 
variable inputs and of net investment by the group of electric utilities affected by a deregulation 
plan are not dramatic. 
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The adjustment rate of capital, ( )[ ]1−− ckAr , is 2.95 percent implying that the capital stock 
adjusts approximately 3 percent per annum to the long-run equilibrium levels. This sluggish 
adjustment of capital results from the non-storable characteristic of electricity and capital-
specific nature of utility investments and magnitude of the investment. Most electric utilities will 
choose to buy power externally to meet additional demand in the short-run rather than build new 
generating plants since prices in wholesale market for electricity are usually not much higher 
than the marginal cost of generating electricity by the electric utilities in the short-run.  
Weighted-average estimates of short-, intermediate-, and long-run input price elasticities 
evaluated at the long-run equilibrium level are reported in Table 3 for both the pre-deregulation 
(1986-1996) and the combined pre- and post-deregulation (1986-1999) periods.12  All own-price 
elasticities have the expected negative sign. Overall, the estimated results of input demand 
elasticities between the two periods are similar and the number of elasticities does not change 
significantly in magnitude between the two periods. The magnitude of the short-run own price 
elasticity of demand for fuel indicates that it is price inelastic. The short-run own price elasticity 
of demand for the aggregate of labor and maintenance is larger in absolute magnitude than that 
for fuel. The cross-price elasticity estimates suggest that fuel, capital, and the aggregate of labor 
and maintenance are substitutes. The magnitude of the intermediate-run elasticity changes from 
the short-run elasticities is not significant because of the low adjustment rate of capital stock to 
its long-run equilibrium level. The long-run own price elasticities of demand for fuel and the 
aggregate of labor and maintenance are larger in absolute magnitude than the short-run own price 
elasticities. The magnitude of the long-run own price elasticity of capital indicates that it is 
significantly price elastic. The cross-price elasticity estimates suggest that fuel, capital and the 
                                                 
12  Derivations of input demand elasticities are presented in Appendix C 
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aggregate of labor and maintenance are substitutes and the relatively large cross-price elasticities 
suggest the significant substitution possibilities among these inputs. 
 The estimated optimal capital stocks are calculated and compared to the actual capital 
stocks to account for the capacity utilization which provides some insight into the efficiency of 
capital use by a firm. Values of the ratio of optimal capital to actual capital stocks less than one 
imply that a firm is over-utilizing capital while values greater than one imply that a firm is 
under-utilizing capital. The distribution of the ratio of capital by firm is presented in Figure 2. 
There are 46 firms with values of the ratio of capital below the average. The estimated results 
indicate that all electric utilities in this study except by three firms, Kansas Gas & Electric Co. 
(KS), The Detroit Edison Co. (MI), and Texas Utilities Electric Co. (TX) are over-capitalized. 
 Table 4 presents weighted-average estimates of the short- and long-run marginal cost, 
average variable cost, average total cost, and scale elasticity for both the pre-deregulation 
(1986-1996) and the combined pre- and post-deregulation (1986-1999) periods13. The short-run 
scale elasticity is defined as the ratio of short-run average variable cost to short-run marginal cost 
while the long-run scale elasticity is defined as the ratio of long-run average variable cost to 
short-run marginal cost (Stefanou, 1989). Scale elasticity values less than one imply decreasing 
returns to scale while values greater than one imply increasing returns to scale. Overall, the 
estimates of the pre-deregulation period are consistent to the combined pre- and 
post-deregulation period. The estimates of short- and long-run marginal costs are 2.077 and 
1.827 cents per kwh, respectively, for the pre-deregulation period. They decrease to 1.938 and 
1.782 cents per kwh, respectively, for the combined pre- and post-deregulation period. In 
addition, the estimates of short- and long-run average total costs are 2.996 and 2.674 cents per 
                                                 
13  Derivation of scale elasticity is presented in Appendix D 
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kwh, respectively, for the pre-deregulation period and 2.774 and 2.447 cents per kwh, 
respectively, for the combined pre- and post-deregulation period. These results support the 
hypothesis that the deregulation of energy generation can provide important incentives for the 
efficient operation of electrical generators by lowering costs to maximize profits. The estimate of 
scale elasticity measure indicates increasing returns to scale in the industry pre- and 
post-deregulation. However, the estimates for the pre-deregulation period indicate higher 
increasing returns to scale in the industry than those for the combined pre- and post-deregulation 
period.  
7. Conclusions 
This study addresses the evolution of the structure of electricity production as the 
industry faces deregulation using a structured economic model of dynamic production. The static 
shadow price approach and the dynamic duality model of intertemporal decision making are 
integrated to formalize the theoretical and econometric models of dynamic efficiency for cost 
minimizing firms. The results indicate most electric utilities in this study underutilized fuel 
relative to the aggregate of labor and maintenance and they overutilized net investment. The 
result suggests that electric utilities with relatively high technical inefficiency in production in 
states adopting a deregulation plan improve the performance of the utilities. The magnitudes of 
the difference of allocative efficiencies of variable inputs and of net investment by the group of 
electric utilities affected by the deregulation plan are not significant. The estimates of the short-, 
intermediate-, and long-run input price elasticities indicate the substitution possibilities among 
the inputs. Most electric utilities in this study had optimal capital below actual capital stocks 
implying that most electric utilities are over-capitalized in the production. The estimates of 
short- and long-run average (marginal) costs for the pre-deregulation period are higher than those 
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for the combined pre- and post- deregulation period. These results suggest that the deregulation 
of energy generation will provide important incentives for the efficient operation of electrical 
generators and it presents firms with the incentives to lower costs to maximize their profits. The 
estimate of scale and elasticity measures indicates a supporting evidence of increasing returns to 
scale in the industry pre- and post- deregulation. However, the estimates for the pre-deregulation 
period suggest higher increasing returns to scale in the industry than those for the combined pre-
and post- deregulation period. 
 
References 
Atkinson, S. E. and R. Halvorson.  "A Test of Relative and Absolute Price Efficiency in 
Regulated Utilities." Review of Economics and Statistics 62(1980): 81-88. 
Atkinson, S.E. and D. Primont. “Stochastic Estimation of Firm Technology, Inefficiency, and 
Productivity Growth Using Shadow Cost and Distance Functions.” Journal of 
Econometrics 108 (2002): 203-225. 
Averch, H. and L. L. Johnson. “Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint.” American 
Economic Review 52 (1962): 1052-1069. 
Bernstein, J.I. and M.I Nadiri.  “Research and Development and Intra-Industry Spillovers: An 
Empirical Application of Dynamic duality.”  Review of Economic Studies 56(1988): 249-
69. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics WebPages, http://stats.bls.gov/blshome.htm. 
Christensen, L. R. and W. H. Greene. “Economies of Scale in U.S. electric power generation.” 
Journal of Political Economy 84 (1976): 655-676. 
 23
Coelli, T.J., D. S. P. Rao, and G. E. Battese. “An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity 
Analysis.” Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998. 
Considine, T. J. “Cost Structures for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Power Generation.” The Energy 
Journal, 21(2) (2000): 83-104. 
Cornwell, C., P. Schmidt, and R. C. Sickles. “Production Frontiers with Cross-Sectional and 
Time-Series Variation in Efficiency Levels.” Journal of Econometrics 46(1/2) (October 
1990): 185-200. 
Crew M. A., and P. R. Kleindorfer. “Regulatory Economics: Twenty Years of Progress?” 
Journal of Regulatory Economics 21(1) (2002): 5-22. 
Energy Information Administration WebPages, http://www/eia.doe.gov/index.html. 
Esptein, L. G. “Duality Theory and Functional Forms for Dynamic Factor Demands.” Review of 
Economic Studies 48 (1981): 81-95. 
Epstein, L.G. and M. G. S. Denny. “The Multivariate Flexible Accelerator Model: Its Empirical 
Restrictions and an Application to U.S. Manufacturing.” Econometrica 51 (1983): 647-
674. 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission WebPages, http://www.ferc.fed.us. 
Fernandez-Cornejo, J.,  C. Gempesaw, J.Elterich and S.E. Stefanou.  “Dynamic Measures of 
Scope and Scale Economies: An Application to German Agriculture.”  American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 74(1992): 283-99. 
Granderson G. and C. Linvill.  “Regulation, Efficiency, and Granger Causality.” International 
Journal Of Industrial Organization 20(9) (2002): 1225-1245. 
Hansen, L. “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators.” 
Econometrica 50 (1982): 1029-1054. 
 24
Hiebert, L. D. “The Determinants of the Cost Efficiency of Electric Generating Plants: A 
Stochastic Frontier Approach.” Southern Economic Journal 68(4) (2002): 935-946. 
Kumbhakar, S. C. and C. A. K. Lovell. “Stochastic Frontier Analysis.” New York, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Luh, Y.-H. and S. E. Stefanou.  “Productivity Growth in U.S. Agriculture under Dynamic 
Adjustment.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 73(4): 1116-25. 
 
Luh, Y.-H. and S. E. Stefanou.  “Learning-By-Doing and The Sources of Productivity Growth: A 
Dynamic Model with Application to U.S. Agriculture. “  Journal of Productivity Analysis  
4 (1993): 353-70.  
Luh,Y.H. and S.E. Stefanou.  “Estimating Dynamic dual Models under Nonstatic Expectation,” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78(4): 991-1003. 
McLaren, K. R. and R. J. Cooper. “Intertemporal Duality: Application to the Theory of the 
Firm.” Econometrica 48 (1980): 1755-1762. 
Nerlove, M. “Returns to Scale in Electricity Supply,” in Measurements in Economics Studies in 
Mathematical Economics and Econometrics in Memory of Yehuda Grunfeld, edited by C. 
F. Christ, Stanford University Press, 1963. 
Newey, W. and K. West. “A Simple Positive Semi-definite, Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix.” Econometrica 55(1987): 703-708. 
Newey, W. and K. West. “Automatic Lag Selection in Covariance Matrix Estimation.” Review of 
Economic Studies  61(1994): 703-708. 
Schmidt, P. and C. A. K. Lovell. “Estimating Technical and Allocative Inefficiency Relative to 
Stochastic Production and Cost Functions.” Journal of Econometrics 9(3) (February 
1979): 343-366. 
 25
Smith, V. L. “Regulatory Reform in the Electric Power Industry.” Regulation 19(1) (1996): 33-
46.  
Stefanou, S. E. “Returns to Scale in the Long Run: The Dynamic Theory of Cost.” Southern 
Economic Journal 55 (1989): 570-579. 
Toda, Y.  "Estimation of a Cost Function When the Cost is not Mimimum: The Case of Soviet 
Manufacturing Industries, l958-l97l." Review of Economics and Statistics 58(l976):259-
268. 
Treadway, A. B. “The Rational Multivariate Flexible Accelerator.” Econometrica 39 (1971): 
845-855. 
Treadway, A. B. “The Globally Optimal Flexible Accelerator.” Journal of Economic Theory 7 
(1974): 17-39. 
Vasavada, U. andR.G. Chambers.  “Investment in U.S. Agricutlure.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics  68(1986): 950-60. 
 26
Appendix A 
 The system of equations (15) and (16) can be written in terms of the parameter estimates 
to yield the optimized actual investment demand equation  
 
,
2
22
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+++
++
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+++
++
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−
yAtAKA
cAwAA
r
yAtAKA
cAwAA
A
Ar
A
AAAKAw
A
AAAr
KA
A
AA
rr
cyctck
ccbwcc
k
kyktkk
ckbwkk
ck
cc
k
ck
ktcc
kctkkctb
ck
ccwk
wc
x
ock
ck
kkcc
k
µ
τ
µ
τ
µ
τ
µ
τ
µ
ττ
µ
τ &
     (A1) 
and the optimized actual demand for variable inputs demands equation is 
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 The steady state capital stock presented in equation (20) can be written in terms of the 
parameter estimates as  
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Appendix B 
 
Lists of Electric Utilities in This Study 
 
No. 
 
Utility Name 
 
State Dum No. 
 
Utility Name State Dum 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
 
Cincinnati Gas & Electric 
Montaup Electric  
New England Power  
PECO Energy  
Arizona Public Service  
Atlantic City Electric  
Niagara Mohawk Power  
Central Illinois Light  
Central Illinois Pub Service  
Central Louisiana Electric  
Commonwealth Edison  
Consumers Power  
The Dayton Power & Light  
Duquesne Light  
Florida Power & Light  
Florida Power Corp 
Hawaiian Electric  
Houston Lighting & Power  
Indianapolis Power & Light  
Kentucky Utilities  
Louisville Gas & Electric  
Northern Indiana Pub Service  
Portland General Electric 
PSI Energy  
Public Service Electric & Gas 
Sierra Pacific Power  
South Carolina Electric & Gas 
Southern California Edison  
Tampa Electric  
Texas Utilities Electric  
Virginia Electric & Power  
Wisconsin Electric Power  
Wisconsin Power & Light  
Baltimore Gas & Electric  
Boston Edison  
Carolina Power & Light  
 
OH 
MA 
MA 
PA 
AZ 
NJ 
NY 
IL 
IL 
LA 
IL 
MI 
OH 
PA 
FL 
FL 
HI 
TX 
IN 
KY 
KY 
IN 
OR 
IN 
NJ 
NV 
SC 
CA 
FL 
TX 
VA 
WI 
WI 
MD 
MA 
NC 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Central Maine Power  
Consolidated Edison Co-NY  
Delmarva Power & Light  
Duke Power  
El Paso Electric  
The Empire District Electric  
Gulf States Utilities  
Illinois Power  
Interstate Power  
Kansas City Power & Light  
Kansas Gas & Electric  
Long Island Lighting  
Madison Gas & Electric  
Minnesota Power & Light  
Montana Power  
Nevada Power  
New York State Electric & Gas 
Oklahoma Gas & Electric  
Orange & Rockland Utilities  
Otter Tail Power  
Pacific Gas & Electric  
Pennsylvania Power & Light  
Potomac Electric Power  
Public Service Co of Colorado 
Public Service Co of NM  
Rochester Gas & Electric  
San Diego Gas & Electric  
Southern Indiana Gas & Electic 
Southwestern Public Service  
St Joseph Light & Power  
The Detroit Edison  
Union Electric  
United Illuminating 
UtiliCorp United I 
Wisconsin Public Service  
NY 
ME 
NY 
DE 
NC 
TX 
MO 
TX 
IL 
LA 
MO 
KS 
NY 
WI 
MN 
MT 
NV 
NY 
OK 
NY 
MN 
CA 
PA 
DC 
CO 
NM 
NY 
CA 
IN 
TX 
MO 
MI 
MO 
CT 
MO 
WI 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
* Dummy variable which “1” indicates electric utilities in “Group A” whereas “0” represents electric utilities in 
“Group B” 
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Appendix C 
Derivation of input demand elasticities 
 Following Luh and Stefanou (1993), the short-, intermediate-, and long-run elasticities 
evaluated at the behavioral input prices are derived in the following. Defining the optimized 
actual variable input demands ** bnx
o
n xx τ= (n = fuel and aggregate labor and maintenance) and the 
behavioral input prices as bmw (m = fuel, aggregate labor and maintenance, and capital). 
 Short-run variable input demand elasticity is  
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 Intermediate-run variable input demand elasticity is  
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Since ( ) ( )( )⋅−=⋅ ** ititbit KKMK&  and ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −= −1bckJrIM , ( ) ( ) bmbmb wKMwK ∂⋅∂−=∂⋅∂ **& . 
Therefore,  
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 Long-run variable input demand elasticity is  
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When the quasi-fixed factors adjust instantaneously ( )⋅= *KK , IM −= . Hence, ( ) ( )⋅−=⋅ ** KK b&  
and ( ) ( ) mmb wKwK ∂⋅∂−=∂⋅∂ **& . Therefore,  
 ( ) b
kwb
n
b
mSR
wxb
m
b
n
b
m
b
kw
b
n
b
ww
b
mLR
wx bn
b
m
b
n
b
n
b
m
b
n
b
m
o
n
J
x
w
w
K
x
wJ
x
Jrw
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+=∂
⋅∂+= *
*
** εε .      (C5) 
 29
Defining the steady state capital stock as *K , intermediate-run capital elasticity is  
 b
m
b
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*,ε .           (C6) 
Long-run capital elasticity is  
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Appendix D 
Derivation of scale elasticity 
The scale elasticity associated with the production technology is defined as the 
percentage change in output responds to a percentage change in all inputs. Following Stefanou 
(1989), the dynamic theory of cost allows for the selection of variable input demands and 
investment. The optimized actual dynamic programming equation in equation (5) can be viewed 
as the long-run cost function associated with the actual quantities. The short-run cost function 
associated with the actual quantities is defined as the summation of variable cost, *owx , and fixed 
cost, cK . The long-run average cost (LRAC) at time t is calculated by dividing the equation (5) 
with output, ( )ty , while the short-run average cost (SRAC) at time t is calculated by dividing the 
short-run cost function with ( )ty . The long-run marginal cost (LRMC) at time t is calculated by 
differentiating equation (5) with respect to ( )ty  while the short-run marginal cost (SRMC) at time 
t is calculated by differentiating the short-run cost function with ( )ty .  
 The short-run scale elasticity associated with the actual quantities yields  
 ,*
*
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SRAVCSE a
o
SR
γ==           (D-1) 
where ( )
dy
cKwxd oa +=
*
*γ  is the short-run marginal cost (SRMC) at time t, and the long-run scale 
elasticity associated with the actual quantities yields 
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Table 1: Estimated Structural Coefficients, GMM Estimation Period 1986 to1999 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
P-value Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
P-value
 
(ACK)-1 
A0 
Ac 
Awc 
Acc 
Act 
Acy 
Aw 
Aww 
Awt 
Awy 
 
0.020 
-17.870 
13.270 
-1.582 
-32.110 
-0.682 
0.176 
0.637 
-0.931 
-0.084 
0.126 
 
 
0.001 
4.611 
3.020 
0.202 
4.241 
0.223 
0.086 
0.200 
0.115 
0.014 
0.007 
 
[.000] 
[.000] 
[.000] 
[.000] 
[.000] 
[.002] 
[.042] 
[.001] 
[.000] 
[.000] 
[.000] 
 
 
Awk 
Ay 
Ayy 
Ayt 
At 
Att 
Ak 
Ayk 
Akt 
Akk 
 
2.588 
0.459 
0.029 
-0.004 
0.396 
0.007 
74.570 
-0.496 
-0.702 
7.576 
 
0.094 
0.567 
0.017 
0.032 
0.389 
0.042 
9.026 
0.262 
0.406 
4.990 
 
[.000] 
[.418] 
[.082] 
[.902] 
[.310] 
[.870] 
[.000] 
[.059] 
[.084] 
[.129] 
Equation 
Investment 
Fuel 
Labor and Maintenance 
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions 
R2 
0.025 
0.976 
0.951 
397.584 
DW 
1.770 
1.606 
1.035 
[.000] 
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Table 2: Average Firm Allocative and Technical Efficiencies of Net Investment and of Variable Input 
Demands, Given Firms are Perfectly Technical Inefficient in Net Investment 
 
Electric Utilities Allocative Inefficiency 
of net investment 
Technical Inefficiency 
of variable input 
Allocative Inefficiency 
of variable input 
All Electric Utilities 
        Minimum 
        Maximum 
        Average 
Average Group A1 
Average Group B2 
 
0.200 
1.218 
0.594 
0.589 
0.611 
 
0.241 
0.991 
0.767 
0.725 
0.809 
 
0.084 
6.464 
3.105 
3.065 
3.151 
1    Electric utilities are located within of states with the deregulation plan 
2      Electric utilities are located outside of states with the deregulation plan 
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Table 3: Short-Run, Intermediate-Run, and Long-Run Elasticities for the periods of 1986-1999 
 
Prices 
Quantity 
Fuel Labor and Maintenance  Capital 
Short-Run 
    Fuel 
    Labor & Maintenance 
Intermediate-Run 
    Fuel 
    Labor & Maintenance 
    Capital 
Long-Run 
    Fuel 
    Labor & Maintenance 
    Capital 
 
-0.105 
0.733 
 
-0.112 
0.773 
0.036 
 
-0.325 
0.868 
1.214 
 
(-0.095) 
(0.673) 
 
(-0.121) 
(0.690) 
(0.042) 
 
(-0.304) 
(0.974) 
(1.399) 
 
0.105 
-0.733 
 
0.111 
-0.776 
0.032 
 
0.315 
-0.876 
1.090 
 
 
(0.095) 
(-0.673) 
 
(0.119) 
(-0.695) 
(0.030) 
 
(0.295) 
(-0.985) 
(1.002) 
 
 
0.196 
0.605 
 
0.254 
0.612 
-0.051 
 
0.391 
0.839 
-1.712 
 
 
(0.295) 
(0.635) 
 
(0.344) 
(0.643) 
(-0.050) 
 
(0.491) 
(0.869) 
(-1.652) 
 
Note: Estimated values for the pre-deregulation periods of 1986-1996 in parenthesis 
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Table 4: Short-and Long-Run Scale and Cost Elasticities for the periods of 1986-1999 
 
Marginal Cost cents per kwh Average Total Cost cents per kwh 
     Short-Run 
     Long-Run 
1.938  
1.782  
(2.077) 
(1.827) 
     Short-Run 
     Long-Run 
2.774  
2.447 
(2.996) 
(2.674) 
Average Variable Cost cents per kwh Scale Elasticity Value 
     Short-Run 
     Long-Run 
2.653  
2.355 
(2.851) 
(2.550) 
     Short-Run 
     Long-Run 
1.370  
1.215 
(1.373) 
(1.228) 
Note: Estimated values for the pre-deregulation periods of 1986-1996 in parenthesis 
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Figure 1:  The Input-Oriented Measurement and Decomposition of Cost Efficiency 
0
5
10
15
20
25
0.2-0.3 0.3-0.4 0.4-0.5 0.5-0.6 0.6-0.7 0.7-0.8 0.8-0.9 0.9-1.0 1.0-1.2 1.2-1.4 1.4-1.6
Optimal K to Actual K
N
um
be
r o
f F
irm
s
Figure 2: Distribution of the Ratio of Optimal Capital to Actual Capital 
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